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Abstract 
 
This paper provides a comparative assessment of fiscal decentralization in China and 
India, including the standard components of expenditure and revenue assignments and 
institutions for intergovernmental transfers, as well as the nature of subnational 
authorities over general economic activity. In particular, the case of China, where town 
and village enterprises have been very active, is contrasted with that of India, where local 
governments remain circumscribed in their authority, despite decentralizing reforms. The 
implications of differences in decentralization for fiscal outcomes and economic growth 
are discussed. The characterization of each country in terms of concepts of federalism, 
i.e., competitive, cooperative and market preserving federalism, is discussed, in 
attempting to abstract from the two cases to more general lessons for fiscal 
decentralization.  
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1. Introduction 
China and India are the major global growth stories of the past decade. Their size 
and their high growth rates imply that, if they continue on their current trajectories, there 
will be a significant shift in the world’s economic landscape. In each country, despite 
differences in historical circumstances and policies, growth has been accompanied by, 
and almost certainly driven by, a shift toward greater market orientation in economic 
policies. International trade, investment, technology adoption and private enterprise are 
all components of the two countries’ recent economic success. 
 
While redrawing the boundaries between state and market has been a well-
recognized factor in China and India’s growth accelerations, a subtler aspect of 
governance involves the decentralization of government decision-making. This kind of 
decentralization can have two potential positive effects on economic activity and growth. 
First, it can improve the efficiency of delivery of public goods, which may be 
complementary to private goods in supporting economic activity (e.g. infrastructure). 
Second, it can be a facilitating channel for implementing changes in the boundary 
between public and private economic activity, by restraining the power of government 
decision makers. In each case, the potential driving force, as usually theorized, is greater 
accountability through greater competition among government decision-makers for 
approval of constituents. In the Chinese case, however, the personal gain of local 
government decision-makers may also have been a motivating factor. Thus, the benefits 
of decentralization, and the channels through which it works, are not necessarily 
straightforward. In addition, competition and local government capture of economic rents 
may have negative impacts, including underprovision of public goods and rent-seeking 
burdens on private enterprise. 
 
Therefore, this paper examines the relative nature and impacts of fiscal 
decentralization in China and India, with the goal of understanding the role of 
decentralization in the two countries’ economic growth. We include a summary of the 
standard components of expenditure and revenue assignments and institutions for 
intergovernmental transfers, as well as the nature of subnational authorities over general 
economic activity. In particular, the case of China, where town and village enterprises 
have been very active, is contrasted with that of India, where local governments remain 
circumscribed in their authority, despite decentralizing reforms. The implications of 
differences in decentralization for fiscal outcomes and economic growth are discussed. 
The characterization of each country in terms of concepts of federalism, i.e., competitive, 
cooperative and market preserving federalism, is discussed, in attempting to abstract from 
the two cases to more general lessons for fiscal decentralization.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview 
of federal institutions in the two countries, including assignments of authority. Section 3 
explores a theoretical framework for comparing the two countries’ experience, using the 
ideas of market preserving, competitive and cooperative federalism. The key focus is on 
the impact of subnational government spending on private sector productivity, and how 
subnational spending is affected by different institutional assignments of tax authority 
and rules for tax sharing. Section 4 examines the decentralization experience of India and 
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China, relating it to the conceptual models introduced in the previous section. A summary 
conclusion is provided in section 5.  
 
 
2. Federal Systems in China and India1 
 China has a unitary system of government, albeit with several tiers, including 
provinces and local governments. The latter category includes, in descending order of 
size, prefectures, counties and townships (Table 1). A constant feature of China, in 
contrast to India, has been a strong, centralized, one-party system. This institutional 
arrangement has dominated politics, but allowed considerable experimentation and 
variation in terms of economic authority at different levels of government. Before the 
1980s Chinese reforms, which began the country’s sustained growth spurt, taxes and non-
tax revenues (i.e., profits from state enterprises) were collected by provincial 
governments acting as agents of the center. Expenditure planning was a centralized top-
down process, as was the determination of revenue sharing. With reform, there was an 
attempt to create a fiscal contracting system to govern explicit sharing of revenues by the 
provinces with the center. However, the increased economic resources of several 
provinces gave them incentives to manipulate the system to shelter revenues from sharing 
with the center, resulting in fiscal stress at the center.2 In addition to the contracted 
transfers, there was also discretionary borrowing by the center from provinces, and 
transfer payments by the center to other provinces.  
 
At this stage, centralization of political power asserted itself, and in 1994, the 
institutional arrangements finally moved toward a more traditional tax system, with a 
separate national tax collection bureau, and taxes that are shared (including a central 
VAT), as well as others that are assigned to one level of government or another.3 China 
was ahead of India with respect to the introduction of a VAT. However, “extra-
budgetary” revenues, which include tax surcharges, user fees and some state enterprise 
profits, are quite significant, and even institutionalized. Given these features, and the 
somewhat opaque nature of Chinese government budgeting and national income 
accounting, it has been more difficult to conduct an analysis of the Chinese tax system 
than has been the case for India. However, a recent comprehensive study (Asian 
Development Bank, 2005) documents the size and nature of tax revenues as well as extra-
budgetary revenues.4 The former include the VAT (36 percent of budgetary revenues, 
and business and company income taxes (14 percent each). The latter constitute about 4 
percent of GDP, almost all being at the subnational level. 
 
                                                 
1 This section draws on my previous work on these countries, including joint work with M. Govinda Rao 
and T. N. Srinivasan. 
2 Many references have detailed accounts of this process, e.g., Montinola, Qian and Weingast (1995). The 
central government’s share of total revenue declined from about 40 percent in 1985 to less than 25 percent 
in 1993. At the same time, total government revenue also declined as a fraction of GDP, from 29 percent in 
1980 to less than 12 percent of GDP in 1994 (Fedelino and Ter-Minassian, 2006).  
3 Currently, government revenue is about 17 percent of GDP, and the central government has a share of 
about 55 percent (Fedelino and Ter-Minassian, 2006). 
4 Also, see Rao (2003), Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2005) and Fedelino and Ter-Minassian (2006) for 
some observations on the Chinese tax system. 
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Intergovernmental transfers in China have been subject to various regimes, as 
noted, with different formulas and principles used for revenue sharing. Understanding the 
growth impacts of intergovernmental transfers requires some modeling of how 
subnational governments can affect their tax bases. From this perspective, the marginal 
subnational retention rate of all taxes levied on the subnational tax base comes into play. 
Jin, Qian and Weingast (2005) calculated the marginal retention rate for China during the 
high growth phase of reform, 1981-92, and estimated the average marginal retention rate 
for a province at 89 percent, with 68 percent of the provinces having marginal retention 
rates of 100 percent. Subsequently, however, the reliance of subnational government on 
transfers increased, due to the centralization of taxes in 1994. Currently, transfers account 
for about 45 percent of subnational revenues (Asian Development Bank, 2005, Table 15). 
However, Jin, Qian and Weingast (2005) argue that the effective marginal retention rates 
in the new (post-1994) system are similar to those in the early reform period.5
 
To sum up, in China, strong local and provincial fiscal autonomy can be seen as 
establishing a de facto federal structure, even in the absence of legally-based political and 
bureaucratic institutions of federalism. In this view, subnational fiscal autonomy on the 
revenue side works in both directions, up and down, so that, in this respect, it is 
supportive of hard budget constraints.6 At the same time, this arrangement may be less 
amenable to managing regional inequalities, which may be emerging as a serious 
problem in the case of China, threatening to get beyond the central government’s ability 
to manage them (Fedelino and Ter-Minassian, 2006).  Furthermore, as we discuss in 
section 4, there may be emerging fiscal problems at the local, as opposed to provincial, 
level of China’s subnational governments. 
 
 India, in contrast to China, is a constitutional democracy, with explicitly federal 
features, albeit biased toward central control. There are directly elected parliamentary-
style governments at the national and state level, as well as relatively new directly elected 
government bodies at various local levels (separated into urban governments of various 
sizes and three tiers of rural government – district, block and village group; see Table 1). 
Overlapping political authorities at the central and state levels were dealt with through 
intra-party bargaining in the 1950s and early 1960s, in an era of effective single-party 
rule. More recently, the rise of regional parties in states and their presence in national 
coalitions has led to more explicit bargaining.  
 
India’s constitution spells out in some detail the assignment of taxation powers 
and expenditure responsibilities among states, and mandates the appointment of a 
Finance Commission every five years to make recommendations on tax sharing between 
center and states, and among the states. In 1993, constitutional amendments mandated 
state finance commissions to oversee state-local transfers. In 1950, an extra-constitutional 
body, the Planning Commission, was established, and it makes grants to states in support 
of their five-year plans (which the Commission formally approves).  Also, central 
                                                 
5 Shah and Shen (2006) provide a recent analysis and suggestions for reform of the Chinese 
intergovernmental transfer system. 
6 See, in particular, Montinola, Qian and Weingast (1995), Cao, Qian and Weingast (1999) and Jin, Qian 
and Weingast (2005). 
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ministries make their own grants in support of centrally sponsored schemes to be 
implemented by the states.  Various formulas are used in determining transfers, but 
considerable discretion remains at the margin, and there are issues of coordinating 
transfers recommended by the Finance Commission and the Planning Commission. The 
Finance Commission’s goals include equity, efficiency, predictability and stability.  Its 
transfers are meant to correct both vertical (between center and states) and horizontal 
(among the states) imbalances. The vertical imbalance reflects in large part the 
constitutional provisions relating to taxes and expenditure responsibilities.  Horizontal 
imbalances depend not only on differential capacities, needs and costs, but also on the 
efficiency with which capacities are used to deliver services at the least possible cost.  
 
In 2004-2005, the states on average raised about 39 percent of combined 
government revenues, but incurred about 66 percent of expenditures.7  Transfers from the 
center, including tax-sharing, grants and loans made up most of the difference, with the 
states also borrowing moderately from other sources. Focusing on current expenditure 
only, states financed about 58 percent of that total from their own sources of revenue in 
2004-05, up from 52 percent in 2002-2003, but considerably lower than the ratio that had 
prevailed in the early days of the federation. In terms of total expenditure (including 
capital spending), the states covered only about 42 percent by their own revenue receipts 
in that year. There has always been considerable variation across the states in their 
transfer dependence, and the ranking is not completely determined by per capita income. 
For the three years 2000-2003, of the 16 larger states, the ratio of own revenue to revenue 
expenditure ranged from 78 percent to 25 percent (Finance Commission, 2004, Annexure 
7.10). 
  
While India never took measures such as collectivization, the central and state 
governments followed a philosophy similar to that of China in producing goods and 
services for which more cost-effective alternatives in the private sector have always 
existed or have come into existence in recent decades. Public enterprises in India, as in 
the Chinese case, have significant impacts on the revenues, expenditure and borrowing of 
governments at all levels. Indeed, the use of such enterprises for borrowing under state 
guarantees has created contingent liabilities for the states, besides being a non-transparent 
device to raise resources outside the formal budget. In India, contingent liabilities from 
guarantees in support of loss-making public enterprises constitute about 12 percent of 
GDP. This is in addition to the existing debt of these enterprises, which is about 10 
percent of GDP. 
 
 
3. Theoretical Perspectives 
Conceptual or theoretical discussions of federalism encompass a wide variety of 
perspectives, including law, politics and economics. Here we are focused on implications 
of federal structures for economic development. Thus, we abstract from details of legal 
and political institutions in sketching a theoretical framework that allows comparing the 
                                                 
7 These figures are constructed from various tables in Reserve Bank of India (2006). Both proportions do 
vary somewhat from year to year, and have been subject to political cycles. The estimated figures for 2005-
06, calculated from the same source, were 38 percent of revenue and 60 percent of expenditure. 
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Chinese and Indian cases. At the same time, it is useful to consider overall conceptions of 
federalism that have been postulated by scholars outside economics. In particular, 
cooperative, competitive and market-preserving federalism seem to be the most relevant 
descriptors of federalism. Of these, the idea of cooperative federalism has the longest 
history, but is the fuzziest. Various cases of practical cooperation in federations have 
been described, but they often involve noncooperative bargaining or central monitoring 
and control, rather than cooperation in the form of binding agreements. Competitive 
federalism is associated especially with the writings of Albert Breton (1987, 1996), and 
applies the insights of market competition to the government arena. Market-preserving 
federalism (MPF) is a term explicitly coined by Barry Weingast (1993), and has the most 
explicit structure associated with it.  
 
Specifically, MPF is defined by five conditions: (1) a hierarchy of governments 
with delineated authorities (the basis of federalism); (2) primary authority over local 
economies for subnational governments; (3) a common national market enforced by the 
national government; (4) hard subnational government budget constraints; and (5) 
institutionalized allocation of political authority. MPF is of particular interest in 
comparing India and China because it has been used as a benchmark concept for both 
countries. While there has been a debate about where India’s federal system fits the MPF 
system (Parikh and Weingast, 1997; Rodden and Rose-Ackerman, 1997), China has been 
characterized as firmly within the MPF locus, with appropriately decentralized political 
and economic decision-making, and only a common national market somewhat lacking 
(Montinola, Qian and Weingast, 1995). 
 
We provide some minimal theoretical structure needed to elucidate the relevance 
of various features of federalism to promoting economic development. While there is 
already a large literature, with many different assumptions possible, our formulation is 
designed to make some specific points with respect to the interaction of subnational 
government decisions, private economic activity, and overall welfare. Consider, 
therefore, an economy with N subnational jurisdictions, indexed by n = 1,…N. It is 
convenient to assume homogeneity within jurisdictions, so that each can be characterized 
by a representative consumer. It is also convenient to assume that the jurisdictions are of 
equal size, normalized to 1.  
 
The utility of a representative citizen of jurisdiction n is given by  
(1)  U(gn, g-n, G, θ) + xn,  
where gn is the amount of the subnational public good in that jurisdiction, g-n is the vector 
of public goods in all other jurisdictions, G is the amount of the national public good, θ is 
a preference parameter, and xn is the consumption of the private good. The function U(.) 
is assumed to be strictly concave. We are also assuming, for simplicity, that the private 
good enters utility in a linearly separable manner. The presence of the vector g-n allows 
for public good spillovers across jurisdictions, in addition to the implicit spillover effects 
of the national public good. 
 
There is an endowment of an input used to produce the private good, and this 
endowment level is mn. The production function for the private good is given by  
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(2)  yn = f(mn, gn).  
Hence we assume that the productivity of the private sector depends on the supply of 
subnational public goods – we also assume for simplicity that the national public good 
has no such effect.8  
 
The public goods are financed by proportional national and subnational taxes at 
respective rates T (uniform across jurisdictions) and tn on the private good, and public 
goods are produced using these tax proceeds, with constant unit costs, so  
(3)  cngn = tnyn, and  
(4)  cG = TΣyn.  
 
Finally, consumption of the private good is determined by after-tax output,  
(5)  xn = (1 - tn - T)yn.  
 
 If we substitute (5) in (1), we get the following form for the utility function,  
(6)  U(gn, g-n, G, θ) + (1 - tn - T)yn. 
 
 Furthermore, we may substitute (2) through (4) into (6), yielding an expression 
for the utility function as follows: 
(7)  U(gn, g-n, G, θ) + f(mn, gn) - cngn  - cGf(mn, gn)/Σf(mi, gi). 
This expression includes only the levels of the public goods, having incorporated the 
costs and trade-offs of producing the private good and funding the production of the 
public goods.  
 
 The constituents of jurisdiction n will determine the most preferred choice of the 
subnational and national public goods by maximizing (7) with respect to gn and G. Given 
G and the vector g, the tax rates and levels of private consumption would be determined 
by (2) through (5). Note that there are several interdependencies among the jurisdictions. 
Even if there are no direct spillovers in the utility function, we can see that the preferred 
level of gn will depend on g-n through the last term in (7), which reflects the funding of 
the national public good. This interdependence arises because of the effects of the 
subnational public good on local productivity in producing the private good. 
Furthermore, the preferred level of gn will depend on G, the level of the national public 
good, through direct interactions, as well as through the last term in (7) – in this case, the 
level of G matters irrespective of any dependence of local private sector productivity on 
the level of public goods, simply because of the financing effect. 
 
 Since, by assumption, constituents in each subnational jurisdiction have 
homogeneous preferences, there is unanimity within each such jurisdiction with respect 
                                                 
8 This idea is central to the argument in Careaga and Weingast (2001), and captures a key underlying idea 
of MPF, namely that subnational government decisions subject to some kind of discipline – competitive or 
electoral – promote economic development. In Qian and Roland (1998), subnational governments can 
invest in infrastructure, which has the productivity effect posited here. They also have a separate 
subnational public good, which allows for an additional tradeoff to those considered in this paper, where gn 
essentially serves both roles combined. Heady (1998) models a similar tradeoff to Qian and Roland, and 
uses it to interpret data for four Chinese cities. 
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to the level of the subnational public good. However, each jurisdiction will have a 
different most-preferred level of the national public good. A standard majority rule 
argument will imply that the preferences of the median jurisdiction, when ordered by the 
most-preferred level of G, will prevail, provided that preferences are single-peaked. We 
assume that this is the case. In brief, then, there will be n+1 first order conditions9 that 
determine the n+1 public good levels, G and the vector g. 
 
 The presence of interaction effects implies that there is no presumption of 
optimality from decentralized decision-making in this setup. Pareto optimality implies 
maximizing a weighted sum of utilities. Since utilities are linear in the private good, an 
interior allocation will require the weights to be equal. In that case, the social welfare 
function is 
(8)  ΣU(gn, g-n, G, θ) + Σf(mn, gn) - Σcngn  - cG. 
Here, the optimal level of the national public good satisfies the standard Samuelson 
condition that the sum of marginal utilities with respect to G equals the marginal cost, in 
this case c. 
 
 It is useful to compare this with the outcome of decentralized expression of 
preferences by individual jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction considers only its own marginal 
benefit from the national public good, neglecting the benefits to other jurisdictions. 
However, it also does not weigh the full cost, but only its share, f(mn, gn)/Σf(mk, gk). If all 
jurisdictions are identical in all ways, the two mechanisms yield the same result, but in 
general distributional factors will come into play, when there are subnational 
heterogeneities. There is no general result, however, with respect to under or over 
provision of the national public good. 
 
 One can also compare the decentralized and Pareto optimal choices of gn. The 
effects of direct spillovers are obvious, in driving a wedge between the two cases, so let 
us assume for the moment that they are absent. In that case, gn enters the first three terms 
of (7) and (8) in an identical manner, and the only difference comes about from the last 
term of (7). Essentially, increasing gn increases the jurisdiction’s share of the aggregate 
tax base, and therefore its contribution to the national public good. In decentralized 
decision-making, this is treated as an extra cost, one that is not in the social welfare 
maximizing calculus. This effect is also not considered in models that examine only 
subnational decisions, or that do not consider the impact of subnational public goods on 
the local tax base. The result here is that decentralized preferences will tend to 
underprovide the subnational public good, because of the indirect externality operating 
through the payment sharing for the national public good.10
                                                 
9 We assume throughout that all objective functions have the required curvature so that first-order 
conditions are sufficient to characterize all maxima. 
10 This is similar to the issue raised in Careaga and Weingast (2001). In that formulation, the national public 
good is financed by sharing upwards of local tax revenues. Hence, if there is a uniform fraction, say, β, that 
is claimed by the national government, the government budget constraints become cngn = (1-β)tnyn and cG 
= βΣtiyi. In Careaga and Weingast, there is no national public good to consider (or its level is exogenous), 
and β is determined exogenously to subnational preferences. In that case, utility simply becomes U(gn, g-n, 
G, θ) + f(mn, gn) - cngn/(1-β), and the effect of the revenue sharing is to increase the effective marginal cost 
of the subnational public good. If the fact that the revenue sharing leads to an increased level of the public 
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 However, the appropriate comparison may not be with the Pareto optimal 
solution, but rather the centralized outcome achieved through political institutions. In that 
case, the preferences of the median jurisdiction are operative, and the externality effect is 
still present. Thus, this form of centralization is not superior to decentralization in this 
more realistic comparison. An alternative view of centralization would be that it 
aggregates the interests of different subnational jurisdictions through logrolling. This 
would be one conception, therefore, of cooperative federalism.11 In that case, one might 
argue that the logrolling process could lead to maximizing the sum of all utilities, as 
expressed in (8). An alternative would be to consider cooperative game solution concepts 
such as the Nash bargaining solution (NBS). In this case, the maximand would be the 
Nash product of individual jurisdictions’ utility gains from cooperation, say Π(Un – Un0). 
In this expression, Un is abbreviated notation for the utility expression in (7), and Un0 is 
this expression evaluated at the noncooperative, decentralized outcome.12
 
 In the latter formulation, the decentralized (or competitive) outcome acts as the 
threat point for cooperative bargaining. How cooperation is achieved is not fully 
specified, but it is not legally imposed in a federal system, since noncooperation remains 
feasible for individual jurisdictions. Note that, in the formulation used here, competition 
among jurisdictions is attenuated, since there is no mobility of factors of production. This 
seems reasonably realistic for countries such as India and China, where constraints or 
restrictions on internal mobility do exist, especially for labor. On the other hand, the 
implications of mobility have been worked out in an extensive literature, which justifies 
downplaying this aspect of competition here.13
 
 One key aspect of decentralization that is preserved here is the ability of 
subnational jurisdictions to set taxes to finance local public goods. The Indian case is 
quite far from this situation, even after decentralization. States, and especially local 
                                                                                                                                                 
good is recognized, the reduced from utility, after eliminating β has the form U(gn, g-n, G, θ) + f(mn, gn) - 
cngn  - cGcngn/Σcigi. This expression is very similar to (7), differing only in the last term. The difference 
there is that the tax-base-enhancing effect of increasing gn is not recognized, because of the way taxes are 
shared. However, the qualitative impact of this term on the choice of gn remains similar to the case of (7). 
Treisman (2006) analyzes a somewhat different model in which subnational retention can conflict with 
beneficial national level spending, so that the welfare effects are ambiguous. 
11 As Breton (1996) points out, cooperation ought not to be confused with hierarchical imposition of 
cooperative outcomes, which naturally occurs in a centralized system. Breton also uses the analogy of 
cartel instability to argue that horizontal cooperation cannot overcome certain kinds of inefficiencies – 
presumably because binding agreements cannot be signed. However, a Coasian perspective would support 
the idea of efficient bargaining under some circumstances. 
12 Besley and Coate (2003) provide a complete analysis of the comparison between centralized and 
decentralized provision of subnational public goods in a particular case, with two subnational jurisdictions. 
They allow for preference heterogeneity within jurisdictions, spillovers, and also strategic manipulation of 
national representatives’ preferences by subnational voters. However, there is no national public good in 
their model. 
13 A different approach to the benefits of subnational competition stresses the ability to benchmark more 
effectively at that level (Salmon, 1987). Thus, benchmarking promotes accountability. Of course, 
benchmarking can be used at the country level as well: comparisons of India and China are made by voters 
as well as academic analysts. Qian and Roland (1998) explicitly model competition for mobile capital, but 
do not have a national level public good in their framework. 
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governments, rely substantially on transfers from higher level governments to finance 
subnational public goods. Consider the implications of making the extreme assumption of 
complete tax centralization, in the form of a uniform tax. In that case, (5) is replaced by  
(5)′  xn = (1 - T)yn. 
Now there is a single national tax, which finances public goods at all levels. There is an 
aggregate budget constraint, which is   
(4)′  Σcigi + cG = TΣyi. 
If only this aggregate constraint is recognized, then utility reduces to 
(7)′  U(gn, g-n, G, θ) + f(mn, gn) – (Σcigi  + cG)f(mn, gn)/Σf(mi, gi). 
Clearly, this formulation indicates the standard common pool problem with respect to 
financing the local public good: each jurisdiction will prefer a higher level of gn than in 
(7), because the marginal cost is shared across all jurisdictions. 
 
 There is some ambiguity here as to how centralized decision-making would occur. 
If all public good levels, and hence also the tax rate, are voted on by each jurisdiction, 
then there is no ordering that allows application of median voter logic: each jurisdiction 
will seek to expand funding of its own local public good at the expense of others.14 
Essentially, one is missing a rule for allocating the common pool. If there are lump sum 
transfers, say Rn, then the budget constraints become 
(3)′  cngn = Rn.  
(4)″  cG = TΣyi - ΣRi. 
However, the reduced form utility expression remains as in (7)′, once the two budget 
constraints are aggregated. The difference in this case is that each preferred gn is 
determined by (3)′. Of course, all this does is shift the problem to that of determining the 
transfers. A rule such as ‘equal transfers’ may be used, or some other rule-based 
determination made, or there could be bargaining over these transfers. Both India and 
China’s federal institutions exhibit some elements of such processes, combining both 
rules and bargaining. Note that if the transfers are somehow fixed exogenously, the first 
order condition for G has the same form in (7)′ as in (7). 
 
 Bargaining or lobbying with respect to transfers potentially leads to soft budget 
constraints. An increase in Rn directly benefits jurisdiction n by increasing the level of its 
subnational public good (equation (3)′), but the negative impact on the level of the 
national public good is mitigated by the common pool element. In this static framework, 
therefore, the problem of soft budget constraints is essentially the common pool problem. 
The concept of market-preserving federalism emphasizes the need to have hard budget 
constraints. In this case, that prescription is therefore equivalent to avoiding the common 
pool problem associated with centralized taxes and transfers downward.15
                                                 
14 The problem that voters at the national level have a multi-dimensional set of expenditure levels to vote 
on is an example of a larger problem, namely that accountability for a broader set of policies is difficult to 
enforce. Seabright (1996) offers one approach to formalizing this difference in accountability at different 
levels of government. 
15 Note that one can have separate subnational and national taxes, as well as transfers. In that case, transfers 
that are lump sum do not directly affect the marginal incentives of the subnational jurisdiction for 
determining its tax rate. However, there is an indirect impact, through the change in the financing of the 
national public good. The reduced form utility function is now U(gn, g-n, G, θ) + f(mn, gn) - cngn  - Rn – 
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 A key element that is not captured in the above formulation is the low level of 
subnational public good provision in India, which has tended to have greater fiscal 
centralization than China. In fact, the common pool element in the last specification 
implies overspending on local public goods, the opposite of what is observed in India. 
Clearly, an important factor in determining patterns of public allocation is the preferences 
of decision-makers, which do not necessarily reflect those of constituents. Hence, we 
next consider an expanded model of government decision-making.16  
 
 Suppose, therefore, that some fraction of tax revenues is diverted at the local 
level, and consumed directly by government officials. Initially, suppose that there is no 
diversion at the national level. We will begin with the original formulation, with public 
goods at different levels financed by separate subnational and national taxes on output. 
Suppose that a fraction, kn, of subnational tax revenues is diverted. This fraction is 
chosen by the government decision maker. Then the budget constraint for the subnational 
public good becomes 
(3)″  cngn = (1 – kn)tnyn. 
The objective function of the government decision-maker is a weighted sum of 
constituent utility and private gain: 
(6)′  U(gn, g-n, G, θ) + (1 - tn - T)yn + αW(kntnyn). 
Here, α is the relative weight given to private gain, and is exogenously determined, and 
W(.) is a strictly concave function. 
 
 Now the reduced form utility function becomes 
(7)″  U(gn, g-n, G, θ) + f(mn, gn) - cngn/(1 – kn)  - cGf(mn, gn)/Σf(mi, gi)  
+ αW(kncngn/(1 – kn)). 
  
To investigate the choice of kn, let kncngn/(1 – kn) = hn. Then the utility function becomes 
(7)″′  U(gn, g-n, G, θ) + f(mn, gn) - cngn -hn - cGf(mn, gn)/Σf(mi, gi) + αW(hn). 
Hence the first-order condition that determines kn can be written simply as  
(9)  αW′(hn) = 1. 
As shown in the appendix, when (9) holds, the first order condition for gn is unaffected by 
the presence in the objective function of the extra term αW(kntnyn). Thus, constituents 
pay more in taxes, but the level of the subnational public good is unaffected by the 
partially self-interested government decision-maker.  
 
 The intuition for this result is as follows. The government official’s take depends 
on the size of the subnational tax base. Hence, it is not in his or her interest to distort the 
                                                                                                                                                 
(cG+ΣRi)f(mn, gn)/Σf(mi, gi). The lump-sum transfers do have an impact on the incentive to set gn, since 
increasing gn increases national taxes which partly go for transfers. Indeed, we see from this expression that 
an individual jurisdiction would prefer to set Rn equal to zero, ceteris paribus, since it has only a negative 
impact on subnational welfare. This relates to the general problem of transfer dependence (e.g., Rodden, 
2006), which exists independently of issues with respect to the marginal incentives embodied in the transfer 
rules. 
16 Such modeling has numerous antecedents. A recent important set of articles by Bardhan and Mookherjee 
(2005, 2006) provide references, literature overviews and specific models. 
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level of the subnational public good, which is therefore set as if there were no diversion 
and no weighting of private gain. This result may be seen as broadly consistent with the 
Chinese case, where subnational government decision-makers act according to their own 
interests, as well as those of their constituents, but the outcome is still to optimize the size 
of the local tax base. 
 
 Now consider the polar case of a central decision-maker who captures a fraction, 
say, k, of central taxes. Local decision makers simply carry out constituent preferences. 
Let V(.) be the utility from this diversion, and γ the relative weight assigned to it. The 
utility function now becomes 
(10)  U(gn, g-n, G, θ) + (1 - tn - T)yn + γV(kTΣyn). 
The reduced form for this is 
(11)  U(gn, g-n, G, θ) + f(mn, gn) - cngn  - cGf(mn, gn)/((1-k)Σf(mi, gi)) 
+ γV(kcG/(1 – k)). 
 
 Using an argument similar to before, one can show that the optimal choice of k 
leads to no distortion in the central decision-maker’s preferred choice of G.17 The choice 
of gn, however, should be made at the subnational level, in which case the last term in 
(11) drops out. Nevertheless, the diversion by the central decision-maker enters the 
second-last term in (11) and has the effect of increasing the effective cost of the 
subnational public good, leading to underprovision on that score.  This same effect would 
still be operative if there are also transfers from the national level to subnational 
governments, or if subnational public goods are funded through national taxes and 
intergovernmental transfers. 
 
 Therefore, the last formulation gets at some of the features of the Indian case, 
where the objectives of higher-level government decision-makers may lead to 
underprovision of subnational public goods. However, the magnitude of the 
underprovision in the Indian case, which will be brought out empirically in the next 
section, may be greater than can be explained by the kind of effect modeled here. Rao 
and Singh (2003) provide an alternative modeling approach, where there are multiple 
equilibria due to discontinuities, and low efficiency of local government expenditure 
leads to a low expenditure outcome.  
 
 
4. Comparing the Decentralization Cases 
A salient feature of the Chinese case is the success of town and village enterprises 
(TVEs) in contributing to economic development. In 1993, TVEs and other small rural 
enterprises contributed an estimated 36 percent of China’s industrial output, far more 
than the share of large firms (Bouckaert, 2006, Figure 2). The organizational nature of, 
and incentive structures implemented in TVEs have been well-studied (e.g., Fu and 
Balasubramanyam, 2003; Li and Fang, 1997; Bouckaert, 2006), and the impact on growth 
has been empirically documented (DaCosta and Carroll, 2000; Jin, Qian and Weingast, 
                                                 
17 Here one can assume that the subnational jurisdiction which enters the decision-maker’s utility function 
is the median one, when ordered by preferences over G, though this assumes the ordering is independent of 
the subnational good levels. 
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2005). A case has been made, theoretically (Qian and Roland, 1998) and empirically 
(Qian and Weingast, 1996), that decentralization with hard budget constraints has 
characterized this process, so that the Chinese case is an illustration of de facto MPF. 
 
India, on the other hand, has lacked any effective decentralization until the 1990s, 
when state governments began to have some control over economic policies affecting 
private investment (Singh and Srinivasan, 2005). At about the same time, political 
decentralization to the local level began with constitutional amendments to create 
stronger elected local governments. This political decentralization has not been 
accompanied by any significant devolution of funds or authority over local-level 
economic decision-making (e.g., Rao and Singh, 2003; World Bank, 2004). This contrast 
with the Chinese case is important, and deserves to be highlighted. However, we argue 
here that the Chinese experience has additional features that often parallel the issues 
facing subnational governments in India. 
 
We will develop three points with respect to fiscal and policy decentralization in 
China and India. First, China has benefited from greater policy decentralization to the 
provinces, the highest subnational level, as well as some decentralization to local 
governments. Second, problems of soft budget constraints, unclear expenditure 
assignments, insufficient revenue authority, poor fiscal management and, finally, 
inadequate provision of local public goods affect both countries in very similar ways. 
Third, the nature of federalism in both countries is more complex than can be 
encompassed with any of the three well-known conceptual schemes discussed in the 
previous section. 
 
Understanding the Chinese experience is complicated by the fact that theoretical 
discussions applied to China (e.g., Qian and Roland, 1998) often refer to all subnational 
governments as local. Empirical analyses that emphasize hard budget constraints and 
high retention rates work with provincial data (Jin, Qian and Weingast, 2005). In fact, the 
difference between fiscal situations at the provincial and truly local levels is quite 
significant. In particular, local governments in China have been given unfunded 
expenditure responsibilities by provinces, and they have found it difficult to meet 
obligations for providing local public goods (e.g., Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez, 2005; 
Lin, Tao and Liu, 2006). While it has been argued that hard budget constraints at the 
local level have spurred privatization (Cao, Qian and Weingast, 1999), other studies 
suggest that local governments have used extra-budgetary operations, including political 
linkages with local banks, to soften budget constraints and amass significant liabilities 
(e.g., Jin and Zou, 2003; Lin, Tao and Liu, 2006). Shah and Shen (2006) document the 
nature and extent of transfers at the subprovincial level, and their calculations, based on 
unpublished data from the Ministry of Finance, indicate that local governments are very 
significant in carrying out expenditure responsibilities (Table 2), though the degree of 
autonomy is probably severely constrained. 
 
In fact, much of the success of China’s TVEs was initiated under the early reform 
regime, where tax authority was significantly decentralized. In the 1980s, central tax 
revenues fell, and prompted the recentralization of fiscal authority in 1994. Thus, China 
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is not a clear cut case of fiscal decentralization. Certainly, economically powerful 
provinces were able to bargain for provisions in the new system that protected their 
shares of overall government revenues (e.g., Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez, 2005). 
However, they were relatively squeezed, compared to the early reform period, and local 
governments bore the brunt of this squeeze. It remains the case, however, that local 
governments have retained economic authority, and de facto fiscal authority 
(significantly through off-budget activities) than has ever been the case in India. 
 
India’s constitutional and other legal and administrative structures with respect to 
center-state fiscal relations and general power-sharing have not changed significantly in 
the decades since the constitution was ratified, in 1950. The conduct of electoral politics 
did lead to ebbs and flows in the effective degree of political centralization in the 1960s 
and 1970s. However, economic centralization did increase throughout the period, until 
the 1980s, including nationalization of banks and other financial sector institutions, as 
well as more extensive controls of private sector economic activity. Major changes 
occurred after 1991, when the removal of most national-level industrial licensing controls 
allowed states to more freely pursue independent economic policies (Singh and 
Srinivasan, 2005).  
 
The states, starting also from quite different initial conditions, have had varying 
responses to the 1990s policy decentralization, and the result has been greater regional 
inequality (e.g., Rao and Singh, 2005), though perhaps not as extreme as in China. These 
developments were accompanied by a broadening of the scope given by the national 
government to the Finance Commission, allowing it to make recommendations on a 
complete range of issues pertaining to the public finances (Rao and Singh, 2007). 
However, the essentials of the intergovernmental transfer system (including Planning 
Commission and central-ministry-mediated transfers) have remained relatively 
unchanged, reflecting both respect for precedent and bureaucratic inertia. In particular, 
the transfer system is still a contributory factor to soft budget constraints at the state level, 
because of the use of “gap-filling” grants based partly on ex post needs.18 To the extent 
that horizontal equalization considerations are built into the transfer formulas, center-
state transfers in India involve lower effective “retention”19 of revenues generated by 
state tax bases (Singh and Srinivasan, 2006), which may reduce incentives for 
subnational stimulation of private economic activity (Careaga and Weingast, 2001). 
 
The significant legal change that occurred in 1993 was the passage of two 
constitutional amendments creating local governments with mandated electoral 
accountability and provisions for an explicit system of state-local transfers Rao and 
Singh, 2003; Chaudhuri, 2006). Earlier the composition, financing and even existence of 
local governments were completely at the discretion of state governments. While the new 
                                                 
18 This characterizes aspects of both Finance Commission and Planning Commission transfers. The states’ 
budget constraints are also softened by access to captive finance in the form of shares of National Small 
Savings, a rural postal saving scheme (Rao and Singh, 2007). 
19 The inverted commas indicate that this is not retention in the sense of the center appropriating a fraction 
of revenues raised by the states. The formulas apply to revenues from taxes that are constitutionally 
assigned to, and collected by, the central government, but required, also by the constitution, to be shared. 
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legislation gave greater apparent expenditure authority to local governments, in practice, 
with one or two exceptions, state governments continue to exercise effective authority 
over local expenditures, since local government budgets rely almost exclusively on 
transfers from above. With the exception of a few major cities, virtually all decisions of 
economic consequence for local governments are effectively taken at the state or national 
level. In 2002-03, rural local governments’ own source revenues were less than 7 percent 
of their total revenue and less than 10 percent of their current expenditures. Urban local 
bodies did somewhat better, raising about 58 percent of their revenue and covering 
almost 53 percent of their expenditure from own revenue sources. However, aggregate 
local government expenditure constituted only about 5 percent of total government 
spending at all levels. 
 
Despite the strong contrast between China and India in the policy discretion 
afforded to local governments, there have been several similarities. While rural local 
governments in India were mostly nonentities until the 1990s reforms, its towns and cities 
were governed by local councils, typically appointed, and overseen by bureaucrats from 
the elite Indian Administrative Service (IAS), who also served as chief administrators for 
rural districts.20 Despite this nominally strong hierarchical oversight, India’s city 
governments had a poor track record in terms of providing local public goods and in 
maintaining financial health (Rao and Singh, 2003). This situation has not changed 
appreciably in most of India’s towns and cities even after local government reform, and 
parallels the problems of China’s local governments (Martinez-Vazquez and Rider, 
2005).21 In both cases, poor fiscal management practices continue, and their continuation 
is permitted by lack of transparency, including soft, as well as uncertain, budget 
constraints. In both countries, local governments lack adequate tax instruments, and the 
incentive to implement them effectively. In both, they still rely on transfers from the state 
government, and in China, as noted earlier, extra-budgetary operations and politicized 
bank lending are additional alternatives to local taxation. 
 
At the local level, therefore, there is evidence that all the elements of the MPF 
framework are not operative in the Chinese case. In fact, what marks the Chinese 
situation at the local level, and distinguishes from India, is the second MPF condition, 
namely, primary authority over local economies for subnational governments. In both 
countries, there is a well-defined hierarchy of governments. Both lack full internal 
common markets, and both seem to exhibit soft budget constraints at the local 
government level.22 In fact, after its 1993 local government reforms, India seems to 
satisfy the last condition for MPF, namely, institutionalized allocation of political 
authority, more closely than China at this level.  
                                                 
20 The district is the major sub-state administrative unit in India – there are two smaller units below it in 
rural areas, the block and the village-group. Thus, the number of levels and spans of control in India and 
China are quite similar, albeit with very different political and administrative practices. 
21 In this respect, the model of Qian and Roland (1998) is useful in distinguishing two dimensions of public 
expenditure, local public goods and infrastructure for private economic activity. Of course, in reality, the 
two are not independent, but overlap. The model of the previous section recognizes this, but goes to the 
other extreme of combining the two dimensions. 
22 On the lack of common markets, for China, see Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2005), and for India see 
Rao and Singh (2005). 
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Interestingly, the decentralization of economic authority in China down to the 
local government level appeared to take place through the operation of a centralized 
political hierarchy (e.g., Qian, Roland and Xu, 1999; Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez, 2005). 
Provincial and local officials of the ruling Communist party were given signals that they 
should focus on economic success, and rewarded directly and accordingly for 
achievements in this dimension. This created a form of benchmark competition very 
different from what would operate through electoral accountability.23  
 
One is led toward two preliminary conclusions. First, at least in the short run, the 
nature of competition and incentives that operate at the subnational level may be what is 
important, rather than the other elements of MPF. There is, of course, an extensive 
literature that examines the impacts of subnational competition: efficiency does not 
always emerge as the equilibrium outcome. In China, local governments just happened to 
be the vehicle for fostering private sector competition, and did not engage in standard 
fiscal competition. Second, China’s example, of political centralization and economic 
decentralization, may not be one that is generally applicable, since it relies on structures 
that may not be transferable to other contexts. This issue is aside from any intrinsic value 
one would likely assign directly to political freedom. Certainly, this latter point is critical 
for thinking about any lessons for India from China’s experience. 
 
 One might view the discussion so far as supporting a view of the role of 
government competition in federal systems that is broader (e.g., Breton, 1996) than the 
pure MPF definition. On the other hand, there appears to be a stronger case for applying 
the MPF idea at the province/state level in the two countries. Certainly, it is the case that 
China does not have any explicit equalizing system of intergovernmental transfers (ADB, 
200x; Qian and Weingast, 1999), and this implies greater subnational tax retention at the 
margin, and harder budget constraints than in the Indian case. One can also argue that the 
success of TVEs can ultimately be traced to decentralization at the provincial level. In 
that case, more of the MPF conditions are validated at the provincial as opposed to the 
local level. However, it is still true that the implementation of economic decentralization 
in China required the existence of a party hierarchy that stretched down effectively to the 
local level. This condition is not satisfied in India, except perhaps in the state of West 
Bengal, with its own ruling Communist party. Bureaucratic hierarchies in India did not 
serve this role, though perhaps they could have if central authorities had made local 
economic success a benchmark for bureaucratic career advancement, similarly to what 
happened in China.24
                                                 
23 Qian, Roland and Xu (1999) model this formally as an M-form, or multidivisional organization. 
24 It is also true that social fragmentation and vertical divisions are more salient in India. These factors have 
been shown empirically to affect the provision of local public goods in that country (Banerjee et al, 2005; 
Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Banerjee and Somanathan, 2007; Kochar et al, 2006), and may reduce the ability 
or collective desire for such provision, as well as distort the pattern of provision, whatever are the incentive 
structures of local bureaucrats or political decision-makers. Also, Chhibber, Shastri and Sisson (2003) used 
surveys of citizens across India, and found that certain kinds of public goods that might be more reflective 
of social homogeneity, such as neighborhood cleanliness, pollution and crime were perceived as 
unimportant. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005, 2006) also explore the implications of inequality for 
decentralization outcomes.  
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While decentralization obviously may spur competition among subnational 
governments in a federal system, it also increases the potential role of cooperation, 
enforced through legally binding rules or agreements (perhaps mediated by hierarchical 
monitoring and facilitation), or through self-enforcing mechanisms such as repeated 
interaction and reputation. The Chinese case does not seem to illustrate cooperative 
federalism in this sense. The central government and the more economically powerful 
provinces compete for shares of the fiscal pie, but the poorer provinces appear to be left 
out of this bargaining. However, internal Communist Party workings may provide an 
arena for some kind of cooperative bargaining. 
 
India in the 1950s and early 1960s also had a system where bargaining took place 
within the ruling party’s organization. However, several more formal bargaining forums 
have emerged. Both the Inter-State Council (since 1990) and the earlier (but narrower in 
scope) National Development Council provide mechanisms for the center and state 
governments to reach agreement on issues such as tax harmonization and 
intergovernmental transfers (e.g., Rao and Singh, 2005; Singh and Srinivasan, 2005). In 
addition, the emergence of multi-party coalitions in the central government has made 
bargaining more explicit in the national legislature. In many respects, therefore, the 
recent working of India’s federal system corresponds to cooperative federalism. 
However, in neither country do there appear to be mechanisms for cooperation among 
local governments. India and China’s local governments share the characteristic of being 
“overawed” (to use Riker’s term for characterizing the central government’s strength in a 
federation) by state and provincial governments, respectively. 
 
 To summarize the possible lessons of the two decentralization cases, China does 
appear to satisfy some aspects of MPF, especially at the provincial level, but hard budget 
constraints are not clearly present for local governments. The main distinguishing feature 
of the Chinese case is the greater authority of subnational governments with respect to 
economic activity. However, the incentive and control mechanisms for this assignment 
appear to be a form of political-cum-bureaucratic centralization that may not be a 
transferable model. In India, on the other hand, while economic decentralization has 
progressed down to the state level, local governments still have negligible fiscal or policy 
clout. Nevertheless, with some progress in its formal institutional structures, India may 
provide a more promising case for testing the MPF concept. In particular, attempts to 
provide market borrowing mechanisms for state and local governments may be a more 
durable route to hard budget constraints than Chinese bureaucratic authoritarianism. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
The contribution of this paper is to compare the fiscal decentralization experience 
of India and China in the context of commonly used conceptual frameworks of 
federalism, namely, competitive, cooperative and market-preserving federalism. The goal 
of this comparison is to understand better the impact of federal institutions on economic 
development. While some authors have described China as fitting well into the MPF 
framework, and the country’s experience indeed appears to reflect hard budget 
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constraints at the provincial level and decentralization of control over economic activity, 
the special features of the Chinese case make it an awkward exemplar of MPF. In 
particular, the special role of China’s political and bureaucratic structures, including the 
use of strong intra-party incentives – even stronger than one would find in a 
multidivisional firm25 – makes it unique. Competition among local governments has 
worked significantly through these incentive structures, rather than the standard 
economic model of subnational jurisdictions competing to satisfy constituents. 
 
 The Indian case is one where economic decentralization has lagged behind China 
considerably. After economic reform, states have been able to pursue economic policies 
with greater freedom, and this, together with the emergence of coalition governments at 
the national level, has laid the groundwork for some elements of cooperative federalism. 
However, formal political decentralization to the local level without adequate devolution 
of economic powers to local governments has not achieved any significant change in the 
division of responsibility between state and local governments. This contrasts strongly 
with China, where subprovincial governments have much greater responsibility. The 
theoretical modeling exercise in this paper suggests that this greater local autonomy may 
contribute to economic development. In both countries, the greatest problems arise at the 
local level, with lack of adequate tax bases for the expenditure responsibilities that have 
been assigned, either by law (India) or through politico-bureaucratic decisions (China). 
This situation is combined with, and contributes to, soft budget constraints, especially at 
the local level for China, and somewhat at the state level for India. Hence, both countries 
may benefit from similar reforms to achieve more efficient decentralization to the local 
level, with greater sources of own revenue, transfers that do not distort incentives, and 
budget constraints that are firmer and subject to market discipline.  
 
 
Appendix 
 
Proof of Claim in Section 3 
 
Using the formulation in section 3, the budget constraint for the subnational public good 
is 
(3)″  cngn = (1 – kn)tnyn. 
 
The objective function of the government decision-maker is a weighted sum of 
constituent utility and private gain: 
(6)′  U(gn, g-n, G, θ) + (1 - tn - T)yn + αW(kntnyn), 
where α is the relative weight given to private gain, and is exogenously determined, and 
W(.) is a strictly concave function. 
 
The reduced form utility function is 
(7)″  U(gn, g-n, G, θ) + f(mn, gn) - cngn/(1 – kn)  - cGf(mn, gn)/Σf(mi, gi)  
+ αW(kncngn/(1 – kn)). 
                                                 
25 In particular, punishments in China can be more severe than simply firing the individual concerned. 
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Let kncngn/(1 – kn) = hn. Then the utility function is 
(7)″′  U(gn, g-n, G, θ) + f(mn, gn) - cngn -hn - cGf(mn, gn)/Σf(mi, gi) + αW(hn). 
 
Hence the first-order condition that determines kn is 
(9)  αW′(hn) = 1. 
 
Differentiating (7)″ with respect to gn, we have 
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.0
)k1(
ck
f
f
g
cG
)k1(
c
g
f
g
U
n
nn
nn
n
nn
=−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∑∂
∂−−−∂
∂+∂
∂  
 
Combining the third and last terms, we get 
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which is the equivalent to the first order condition without any diversion of funds or 
weighting of the decision-maker’s interests. 
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Table 1: Subnational Government Tiers 
 
China India 
Type Number Type Number 
Province+municipality+ 
autonomous region 
22+4+5 State+national capital 
territory+union territory 
28+1+6 
Prefecture 31 District+municipal 
corporation 
540+109 
County/city 2,109 Block+municipality 5,905+1,432 
Township 44,741 Village+township 236,350+2,182 
 
Sources: Fedelino and Ter-Minassian (2006), Finance Commission (2004) 
Notes: 1. The four Chinese municipalities are Beijing, Shanghai, Tienjin, and Chongqing. These, and the 
autonomous regions, are essentially at the same level as provinces. 2. The Indian figures denote three tiers 
of rural and urban governments respectively. Tiers of rural governments effectively form a hierarchy, 
whereas urban governments are categorized by size and, partly, sophistication of operations.  
 
 
 
Table 2: Subnational Revenues and Expenditures in China, 2003 
 
Governmental level Share of Revenues Share of Expenditures 
Central 71.0 30.1 
Provincial 5.7 18.5 
Subprovincial 23.3 51.4 
 
Source: Shah and Shen (2006), Table 6. 
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